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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78A-3-102(3)0). On October 29, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-3-102(4), and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Appellant, Roger van Frank appeals the Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Kate A. Toomey granting the Appellee's ("the City") motion for summary judgment and 
the district court's Order Denying Roger van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to 
Reconsider. 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. van Frank provides 
this Court with his Statement of Issues for Review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: 
Whether the district court incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary 
judgment and denied Mr. van Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider. 
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr..van Frank's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51) 
1 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. This Court reviews a district court's 
ruling granting summary judgment for correctness. See Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. 
Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, \ 31, 175 P.3d 572. No deference is given to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. See Richards v. Security Pacific Nat'I Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 608 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
ISSUE NO. 2: 
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that portions of Mr. van Frank's 
declaration are not properly supported for purposes of summary judgment. 
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43) and through Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. The admissibility of evidence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, \ 11, 131 
P.3d252. 
ISSUE NO. 3: 
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that a letter written by the 
Director of the City's Building Services Division on the City's letterhead is hearsay. 
2 
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This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting-memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. Questions regarding the meaning and 
application of a rule of evidence is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, ^ 14, 142 P.3d 581. 
ISSUE NO. 4: 
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that Mr. van Frank has not 
provided evidence sufficient to prove or even raise a question of fact regarding his claim 
that the City acted in furtherance of a municipal policy in denying Mr. van Frank the 
ability to practice architecture to the full extent of Utah law. 
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51) < 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. Entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law. Whether the trial court correctly held that there were no genuine issues 
of disputed fact is reviewed for correctness. See K&TInc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 
(Utah 1994). 
3 
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ISSUE NO. 5: 
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that Mr. van Frank does not have 
standing to seek injunctive relief. 
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. A standing determination is primarily a 
question of law and reviewed for correctness. Any necessary factual findings made by 
the district court are given some deference. See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 
UT40,f 14,216P.3d944. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 7: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-1-103: 
"There is created within the Department of Commerce the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. The Division shall administer and enforce all 
licensing laws of title 58." 
4 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-101: 
"This chapter is known as the Architects Licensing Act." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-102(6)(b): 
"Practice of architecture does not include the practice of professional engineering 
as defined in Section 58-22-102, but a licensed architect may perform such professional 
engineering work as is incidental to the practice of architects." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-602(2): 
"Any final plan and specifications of a building prepared by or under the 
supervision of the licensed architect shall bear the seal of the architect when submitted to 
a client, or when submitted to a building official for the purpose of obtaining a building 
permit, even if the practice is exempt from licensure under Section 58-3a-304." 
Utah Aministrative Code, Rule 156-3a-102(6)(a)-(e): 
(6) "Incidental practice" means "architecture work as is incidental to the practice of 
engineering" as used in Subsection 58-22-102(9) and "engineering work as is incidental 
to the practice of architecture" as used in Subsection 58-3a-102(6) which: 
(a) can be safely and competently performed by the licensee without jeopardizing 
the life, health, property and welfare of the public; 
(b) is secondary and substantially less in scope and magnitude when compared to 
the work performed or to be performed by the licensee in the licensed profession; < 
(c) is work in which the licensee is folly responsible for the incidental practice 
performed as provided in Subsection 58-3a-603(l) or Subsection 58-22-603(1); 
5 
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(d) is work that affects not greater than 49 occupants as determined in Section 
1004 of the 2009 International Building Code; and 
(e) is work included on a project with a construction value not greater than 15 
percent of the overall construction value for the project including all changes or 
additions to the contracted or agreed upon work. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(2)(C),(D): 
"A statement is not hearsay if: The statement is offered against a party and i s . . . a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, 
or a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." 
Salt Lake City Ordinances, Title 18.08.020: Powers and Duties of the 
Division: 
"The functions of the division of building and housing services shall be: 
A. To enforce the zoning laws of Salt Lake City and to Inspect, or cause to be 
inspected, all buildings and structures erected, or proposed to be erected in the city; 
B. To carry out, enforce and perform all duties, provisions and mandates 
designated, made and set forth in the ordinances of the city concerning zoning, 
building, plumbing, electrical and mechanical construction, and repair, including 
uniform housing code regulations. 
C. To examine and approve all plans and specifications before permits shall be 
issued, and to execute all permits, certificates and notices required to be issued; 
6 
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D. To examine all applicants for licensing and registration in accordance with 
requirements of Chapter 18.16 of this title, and issue same in accordance with the 
requirements of this title; and 
E. To perform all the functions and have all the powers required of and conferred 
on the building official by the ordinances of the city. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE / COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. van Frank appeals from a Memorandum Decision entered by the district court 
on September 16, 2010 in which the court granted the City's motion for summary 
judgment and denied Mr. van Frank's motion for summary judgment (R.236-47) Mr. van 
Frank also appeals the district court's Order Denying his Motion for New Trial or to 
Reconsider. The order was entered by the district court on February 1, 2011. (R.305-06) 
This case concerns the City's unauthorized actions in refusing to permit an 
architect to perform incidental engineering work as allowed under Utah law and requiring 
an engineer's opinion as a condition for approval of an architect's stamped plans, thereby 
denying an architect the ability to practice his profession to the full extent allowed by 
state law. The City absolutely lacks the authority to make such determinations under 
Utah law. Mr. van Frank seeks redress for the harm done to him by the City by imposing 
unauthorized restrictions on the scope of his state issued architect's licence and thereby 
depriving him of a property right without due process. Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction 
7 
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prohibiting the Division from overstepping its authority by making further unauthorized 
determinations regarding-the permissible scope of an architect's work under Utah law. 
On February 5, 2010, the City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memorandum. (R.50-59) The Declaration of Roger Van Frank was filed on 
February 26, 2010 and Mr. van Frank filed his Opposition to the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and his own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5, 
2010. (R.60-143) The City filed its reply memorandum in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 23, 2010 and filed its opposition to Mr. van Frank's 
Motion on April 2, 2010. (R. 144-71) Mr. van Frank then filed his reply memorandum in 
support of his Motion on April 26, 2010. (R.185-202) 
After a Request to Submit for Decision was filed by Mr. van Frank on May 10, 
2010 the District Court entered an Order requesting counsel for both parties to provide 
supplemental authorities. (R.226-27) A response to the Order was filed by Mr. van Frank 
on August 6, 2010. (R.228-32) No response was filed by the City. A hearing on both 
Motions for Summary Judgment was held on June 16, 2010, in which the District Court 
heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement. (R.225) A Memorandum 
Decision was entered by the District Court on September 16, 2010, in which Judge Kate 
A. Toomey denied Mr. van Frank's Motion and granted the City's Motion. (R.236-47). 
Mr. van Frank filed a Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider with supporting 
memorandum on September 29, 2010. (R.248-68) Mr. van Frank filed his Notice of 
8 
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Appeal on October 14, 2010. (R.269-70) The City's memorandum in opposition to the 
Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider was filed on October 25, 2010. (R.273-77) Mr. 
van Frank's reply memorandum in support of the Motion was filed on November 2, 2010. 
(R.282-88) A Hearing was held on the Motion on January 7, 2011. (R.296) The District 
Court denied Mr. van Frank's Motion and a Memorandum Decision was entered on 
September 16, 2010. (R.236-47) A final Order denying the Motion was entered by Judge 
Kate A. Toomey on February 1, 2011. (R.305-06). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Roger van Frank is an architect at all relevant times licensed by the State of 
Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
(R.23) 
2. The Salt Lake City Building Services and Licensing Division (the 
"Division") is a division of the Department of Community Development of Salt Lake City 
Corporation. (R.68) Mr. van Frank had a contractual relationship with William Buchanan 
in or about June 2007 to provide architectural services to design a garage with a loft that 
Mr. Buchanan proposed to build at 721 Browning Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.61) i 
3. Mr. Buchanan used architectural drawings prepared by Mr. van Frank to 
apply for a building permit with the Division. (R.53) 
I 
9 
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4. As part of the architectural drawings prepared for Mr. Buchanan's permit, 
Mr. van Frank included calculations that he relied upon in designing the floor system for 
the loft on the building plans. (R.61) 
5. The plans showed the calculations of section modulus and load of wooden 
beams to be used for the loft's floor systems. (R.61) 
6. It is understood by Mr. van Frank and admitted to by the City that the 
permit was conditionally denied by the Division based upon Mr. van Frank's calculations 
but subsequently approved without change to the plans. See ^ 11, infra, (R.53) 
7. The Division made a determination that Mr. van Frank's calculations 
exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state 
law and the Division required Mr. Buchannan to provide the opinion of a structural 
engineer to certify the accuracy of Mr. van Frank's calculations. (R.53) 
8. Mr. van Frank was never contacted by the Division prior to the denial of the 
permit to answer any questions or explain his calculations. (R.61) 
9. A year prior to doing work for Mr. Buchanan, Mr. van Frank contracted 
with a Mr. Thomas to perform architectural work. It is the understanding of Mr. van 
Frank that the Division conditionally denied a building permit submitted by Mr. Thomas 
on grounds similar to the Buchanan permit. This understanding is confirmed by a letter 
received by Mr. van Frank from Orion Goff, director of the Division, explaining the 
grounds for the denial of the permit. The letter states that the Division's staff made a 
10 
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"judgment call" based on Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 that Mr. van Frank's 
work exceeded the scope-of incidental engineering work allowed an architect. (R.62; 
R.87-89, Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment) 
10. After the Division denied the permit, Mr. Buchanan obtained the opinion of 
a structural engineer, which certified that the calculations made by Mr. van Frank were, in 
fact, accurate and safe. (R.53) 
11. The Division then issued Mr. Buchanan's permit, requiring no alteration of 
Mr. van Frank's plans, once the engineer's opinion confirmed the engineering 
calculations that Mr. van Frank included on the plans. (R.53) 
12. In Utah, architects are licensed exclusively by the Department of 
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL"). See U.C.A. 
§58-3a-101. 
13. State law expressly permits an architect to perform such engineering work 
as is incidental to the practice of architecture. See U.C.A. § 58-3a-102(6)(b). 
14. State law also provides that DOPL has exclusive authority to make 
determinations as to whether an architect's engineering work is incidental to the practice 
of architecture. See U.C.A. § 58-1-103. 
11 
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15. The regulation cited in Mr. Goff s letter was adopted by DOPL, expressly 
and solely for its use. See (R.87-89) Utah State Administrative Code, R. 156-3a-
102(6)(a)-(e). 
16. Under Title 18 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances, the Division is granted the 
authority to enforce the Uniform Building Code. See Salt Lake City Ordinances, Title 
18.08.020 - Powers and Duties of the Division. 
17. Nothing in Title 18 or elsewhere in the City Ordinances grants the Division 
authority to determine or make judgment calls as to whether an architect exceeded the 
permissible scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed a licensed architect under 
Utah law. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. MR. VAN FRANK'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT AND HE PROVIDED 
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT. 
The district court incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary judgment and 
denied Mr. van Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider. The district court should 
be reversed. Mr. van Frank's claims against the City have merit. Mr. van Frank provided 
admissible evidence sufficient to show that the City, through the Division, exceeded its 
authority in interpreting state licensing laws and limiting the scope of Mr. van Frank's 
architect's license, and thereby violating his property right to utilize his architect's license 
to the full extent allowed by state law without due process. The City has provided no 
12 
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evidence to refute Mr. van Frank's claims or made any effort to explain its actions. In 
light of the City's failure to controvert the evidence submitted by Mr. van Frank, there are 
at minimum genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by a finder of fact. 
II. THE LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY'S BUILDINGS 
SERVICES DIVISION IS NOT HEARSAY. 
The district court is in error in ruling that the letter from Orion Goff referring to 
the Thomas incident is hearsay. This letter is an admission by a party opponent under 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and was drafted by the Director of the City's 
Building Services Division under the scope of his employment with the City, on the 
City's letterhead. It is not hearsay and is evidence of a Division policy to make 
"judgment calls" which limit the scope of Mr. van Frank's architect's license by denying 
him the state-granted right to engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Mr. Goff s 
letter should have been considered by the district court and if it had been, it would have 
established at minimum a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a 
policy followed by the Division to limit the scope of architects' licenses in violation of 
Mr. van Frank's due process rights. 
III. MR. VAN FRANK PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF A CITY POLICY. 
If the City's letter articulating its policy is not excluded on hearsay grounds, Mr. 
van Frank has provided sufficient evidence in support of his claim that the City acted in 
furtherance of a policy in restricting his ability to practice architecture to the full extent of 
Utah law. At the very least Mr. van Frank has raised a factual issue as to the existence of 
13 
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a City policy, a widespread practice, or a decision of a person with final policymaking 
authority to improperly limit the scope of an architect's license. The City has not 
provided any evidence to refute or deny the claims or evidence presented by Mr. van 
Frank. 
IV. MR. VAN FRANK ESTABLISHED GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
Mr. van Frank has standing to seek injunctive relief. There is a realistic 
probability of the City, through the Division, restricting the scope of Mr. van Frank's 
license in the future. Mr. van Frank has provided evidence of the Division's failure to 
recognize the scope of his architect's license on two separate but factually 
indistinguishable occasions and the city has failed to provide any evidence that the 
Division acted within its authority in doing so or that its actions against Mr. van Frank 
were exceptional and not likely to be repeated. 
V. MR. VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION IS PROPERLY SUPPORTED FOR 
PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Mr. van Frank's declaration is properly supported for purposes of summary 
judgment. The district court is in error in ruling that certain statements of material fact 
set forth by Mr. van Frank are not properly supported for purposes of summary judgment. 
These statements are based upon personal knowledge and Mr. van Frank is qualified as a 
licensed architect to make the statements set forth in his Declaration. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court's Rulings Should Be Reversed. 
The district court incorrectly found that there are no genuine issues of fact and 
incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary judgment. (R.236-47) The district 
court's ruling granting summary judgment for the City should be reversed. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the record indicates that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass 'n, Inc., 922 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah 1996). Should 
it be found that genuine issues of fact exist, the reviewing court must reverse the grant of 
summary judgment and remand for trial on those issues. See Id. No deference is given to 
a trial court's legal conclusion. See Richards v. Sec. Pacific Nat'I Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 
608 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
Mr. van Frank has at minimum raised genuine issues of material fact with regard 
to the propriety of the City's actions taken against the scope of his architect's licence. 
Mr. van Frank has presented admissible evidence through his Declaration and the letter 
from Orion Goff, Director of the City's Building Services Division, that demonstrates the 
City's implementation of a municipal policy which works to improperly restrict the scope , 
of Mr. van Frank's architect's licence by not allowing him to engage in the incidental 
practice of engineering, which he is allowed to do under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 
58-3a-102(6)(b). 
15 
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The City failed to provide any admissible evidence either in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment or in opposition to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment that controverts the facts set forth by Mr. van Frank. If not sufficient to allow 
Mr. van Frank to prevail on summary judgment, then the admissible evidence provided by 
Mr. van Frank at minimum creates genuine issues of material fact that preclude either 
party from prevailing on summary judgment. The district court's memorandum decision 
granting summary judgment on the City's motion should therefore be reversed. 
The district court also incorrectly denied Mr. van Frank's motion for new trial or to 
reconsider. The district court ruled that Mr. van Frank's motion was not well taken 
procedurally or substantively. (R.306) This ruling should be reversed. 
Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to Reconsider is properly brought 
under Rule 59(a)(7). Mr. van Frank moved the district court to reconsider its judgment in 
favor the City and/or grant a new trial. Motions for reconsideration have been allowed as 
a means for the Court to reconsider its ruling. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Mr. van Frank argued that there has been an error in 
law in the Court's ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment and properly 
requested that the Court re-examine its ruling in light of Mr. van Frank's Rule 59 Motion. 
Mr. van Frank's motion to reconsider or for new trial has merit and was improperly 
denied. The district court's denial of the motion to reconsider or for new trial should be 
reversed. 
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L MR. VAN FRANK'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT AND AT A MINIMUM HE 
PROVIDED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
Mr. van Frank's claims in this case concern unauthorized actions of the City's 
Building Services Division ("the Division") in limiting the scope of incidental 
engineering work allowed an architect. The Division required an unnecessaiy engineer's 
opinion as a condition for approval of Mr. van Frank's stamped building plans, thereby 
denying him the ability to practice his profession as allowed by State law and depriving 
him of his due process rights. The Division absolutely lacks the authority to make such a 
determination. Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction prohibiting the Division from 
overstepping its authority in making future determinations regarding the permissible 
scope of an architect's work under Utah law. 
A. Mr. van Frank Has the Authority to Perform Incidental Engineering Work. 
As an architect licensed by state of Utah, Mr. van Frank has the authority to 
i 
engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Utah Code Annotated § 58-3a-102(6)(b) 
provides that "a licensed architect may perform such professional engineering work as is 
incidental to the practice of architecture." Utah Administrative Code, Rule 156-3a- { 
102(6)(a)-(e) provides factors to be applied solely by DOPL in determining whether an 
architect's engineering work is incidental. These factors, include safely, competency, 
adequate education, training, relation to architectural work, scope, magnitude, and 
whether the license architect is fully responsible for the incidental work. 
i 
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The Division did not provide any analysis or provide any reasoning as to why Mr. 
van Frank's work did not-comply with this rule. It did not identify a single factor that Mr. 
van Frank failed to satisfy. There are no facts in the record that suggest that Mr. van 
Frank is not competent, lacks adequate education and training, or that the engineering 
work performed by him was not related to architecture. The undisputed facts demonstrate 
that Mr. van Frank has the authority to perform engineering work incidental to the 
practice of architecture. More importantly, the Division provided no opportunity for Mr. 
van Frank to be heard to challenge the Division's "judgment call" and to ensure that the 
decision was rational and not arbitrary and capricious. 
B. The Division Does Not Have the Authority to Make Licensing 
Determinations. 
The Division completely lacks the authority to make determinations of any kind 
regarding the scope of an architect's license. The Division admitted making such 
determinations in its letter to Mr. van Frank regarding previous architectural work done 
for a Mr. Thomas. In the letter, Orion Goff, director of the Division, states that the 
grounds for denying the permit were based on the Division's "judgment calls" that Mr. 
van Frank's work exceeded the scope of incidental engineering work allowed an 
architect. The letter states, "[i]t is our judgment based on Utah Admin Rule 156-3a-102 
that [engineering work] would not constitute "incidental" work for an architect..." (R.87-
89, Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment). It is understood by Mr. van Frank and can be assumed that Mr. Goff s letter 
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in the Thomas case sets forth the grounds for denial of the Buchanan permit in the case at 
hand. In both cases the Division required only the opinion of an engineer to certify the 
accuracy of the incidental engineering work done by Mr. van Frank as shown on his 
plans, and the Buchanan plans were eventually approved as written by Mr. van Frank. 
(R.61-62) Thus, obviously the plans were not unsafe and did not violate the building 
code which the Division is charged with enforcing. The Division simply refused to let 
Mr. van Frank engage in the incidental practice of engineering without any process for 
him to be heard. It never articulated any defect with the plans. It just refused to accept an 
architect's stamp in lieu of an engineer's stamp as a requirement of approving the plans. 
The Division's authority is limited to enforcing the uniform building code. See 
Title 18.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances. While the Division does have the 
authority to question a set of building plans if sufficient safety concerns or articulable 
building code violations are raised, no such concerns were expressed in this case. Mr. 
i 
Goff s letter in reference to the earlier application does not reference any safety concerns 
or building code violations. (R.87-89) Indeed, given that the plans prepared by Mr. van 
Frank for Mr. Buchanan were ultimately approved without revision, it is apparent that \ 
these plans were safe and complied with the building code. When there are no conflicts 
with the building code, the Division must accept plans stamped with the seal of a licensed 
architect and pass any concerns it may have regiarding the scope of engineering work done 
by an architect to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL"). 
i 
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DOPL has exclusive authority granted by the Utah State Legislature to administer 
and enforce all licensing laws under Title 58 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 
58-1-103. The licensing laws governing architects fall under this Title. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-3a-101. The statute that authorizes architects to perform professional 
engineering work that is incidental to the practice of architecture also falls under this 
Title. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-3a-102(6)(b). The determination of what qualifies as 
engineering work "incidental" to the practice of architecture is a determination to be 
made solely by DOPL. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-103. 
The Utah Administrative Rules governing licensing were adopted by DOPL to 
enable it to administer Title 58. Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 specifically 
governs the licensing of architects. As discussed supra, this Rule contains a list of factors 
that are to be applied by DOPL in determining what type of engineering work is 
"incidental" for an architect. See Utah Admin. Rule 156-3a(6)(a)-(e). There are no 
statutory or regulatory provisions that grant the Division the authority to make such 
determinations, let alone arbitrary "judgment calls" concerning the same. There is also 
nothing within Title 18 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances which grants the Division any 
authority to administer or interpret State licensing laws and regulations. 
The Division exceeded its authority in making its.arbitrary "judgment call" and 
determining that Mr. van Frank exceeded the permissible scope of "incidental" 
engineering work by an architect without affording him any semblance of due process to 
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enable him to defend his work and his authority to engage in the incidental practice of 
engineering. If the Division did in fact have concerns over the work done by Mr. van 
Frank it should have identified them, notified Mr. van Frank and passed on any 
complaints to DOPL. 
C. Mr. van Frank Was Denied a Property Interest Without Due Process. 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Mr. van Frank was deprived of a 
property interest without due process of law when the Division arbitrarily limited the 
scope of his architect's license. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution is self-executing. See Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of Box Elder County Sch. 
Dist, 2000 UT 87,110, 16 P.3d 533. This means that it may be judicially enforced 
without implementing legislation. Id. at f 7. Mr. van Frank has stated a due process 
i 
claim under Utah law and he may enforce that claim under the Due Process Clause of the 
Utah Constitution. 
That the building permit was applied for in Mr. Buchanan's name and not Mr. van i 
Frank's is not determinative of standing in this case and the district court correctly ruled 
that Mr. van Frank does have standing to seek damages. (R.242) Architects do not apply 
( 
for a building permit for plans they have prepared. The owner of the project applies for 
the permit. Mr. van Frank was damaged by the Division's denial of his due process rights 
21 
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when the Defendant denied him the ability to engage in the incidental practice of 
engineering as his state-granted license allows, and consequently damaged his reputation 
with his client. 
To state a claim for deprivation of due process, a party must allege three elements: 
1) that through state action he was, 2) deprived of a constitutionally recognized life, 
liberty, or property interest, 3) without an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful way. See Millet v. Logan City, 2006 UT App 466, f 8, 147 P.3d 971. 
1. Mr. van Frank's Property Rights were Deprived under Color of State 
Law. 
Mr. van Frank's property rights were deprived under color of state law and 
in accordance with a municipal policy. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the 
Division, an agency of the named Defendant in this action, Salt Lake City Corporation, 
follows a policy of making "judgment calls" regarding the scope of an architect's work. 
This practice is set forth in the June 2006 letter from Orion Goff to Mr. van Frank in 
which Mr. Goff explains that Mr. van Frank's plans for a prior project were rejected 
based upon a judgment call made by Division staff. As previously discussed Mr. Goff 
states in the letter that, " it is our judgment, based on Utah Admin R. 15 6-3 a-102 that a 
lateral analysis of the area in question to determine the seismic resisting forces would not 
constitute "incidental" work for an architect...." (R.87-89) 
This letter serves as undisputed proof that Mr. van Frank's property rights were 
deprived through state action under the color of state law. While written regarding 
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another project and building permit for a Mr. Thomas, both the Thomas and Buchanan 
incidents are factually indistinguishable. In both instances, the Division made an arbitrary 
judgment call in denying the permits based upon the assertion that Mr. van Frank 
exceeded the scope of his architect's license in preparing the building plans. Given the 
Division's silence as to the reason that the Buchanan permit was denied there is no other 
reasonable explanation for the Division's conduct other than the fact that the Division 
took the same arbitrary position in this case with the Buchanan permit as it did with the 
Thomas permit. This municipal policy directly deprived Mr. van Frank of his property 
right to practice architecture to the full extent allowed under Utah law. 
2. Mr. van Frank was Deprived of a Property Right. 
Mr. van Frank was deprived of a property interest through the Division's 
arbitrary restriction of his architect's license. Property interests are created and their 
dimensions defined by existing rules and understandings that stem from them. See Hyde 
Park Co. v. Santa Fe Council 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). After a license to 
practice a particular profession has been acquired, a licensed professional has a protected 
property interest in practicing that profession. Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam 'rs, 
842 A.2d 936, 946 (Penn. 2004). The right to engage in a profession is a property right 
which is entitled to protection by the law and the courts.. Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 
531, 533 (Utah 1956). 
23 
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The right to work and earn a living in one's chosen profession serves as one of the 
fundamental freedoms that the Constitution serves to protect. Mr. van Frank is licensed 
to practice architecture by the state of Utah and therefore has the right to practice in his 
chosen field to the full extent that the law allows. See id. Mr. van Frank complied with 
state law in preparing the building plans and properly provided the requisite calculations 
for the floor plans (the calculation of the section modulus and load of the wood beams) on 
the plans. (R.61) The plans also bore his architect seal as is required by Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-3a-602(2). 
Mr. van Frank has a protected property right to practice architecture in the state of 
Utah and he has the right under state law to engage in the incidental practice of 
engineering. Mr. van Frank was deprived of a property right when the Division limited 
his ability to fully practice architecture as allowed under state law by arbitrarily rejecting 
his plans and requiring his client to obtain an unnecessary engineer's opinion. 
3. Mr. van Frank Was Not Given the Opportunity to Be Heard. 
Mr. van Frank was never given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
time and manner. In both instances where his plans were rejected, he was never directly 
notified by the Division of its decision but instead found out through his clients. (R.61). 
He was never afforded the opportunity to explain his work or demonstrate that his 
calculations were not only accurate but that such work was permissible for him to 
perform as a licensed architect. 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Division's decision imposed a significant impairment on Mr. van Frank's 
ability to practice his profession by questioning his professional skills without a hearing 
or even a telephone call or letter to ask questions about his work before rejecting it and 
informing his clients of the rejection. The essential requirement of due process is that 
every citizen be afforded "his day in court" or in this case, an opportunity for Mr. van 
Frank to defend and explain his work before it was arbitrarily rejected. See Celebrity 
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982). Mr. van 
Frank was not afforded due process and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time 
or manner. 
Furthermore, the Division's "judgment call" was arbitrary and capricious. A 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence and a 
reasonable mind would not reach the same conclusion. See Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, f 12, 116 P.3d 978. The Division's 
unreasonable decisions requiring further engineering opinions were not supported by any 
evidence or analysis and were indeed arbitrary and capricious. No safety issues or 
building code violations were articulated or identified. The Division merely required an 
engineer's stamp on the plans instead of allowing the stamp of an architect. The plans 
were approved without change, except that the plans bore an engineer's stamp instead of 
an architect's stamp. 
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D. The Granting of a Permanent Injunction is Proper in This Case. 
Because of the Division's arbitrary and wholly unauthorized policy of determining 
the permissible scope of engineering work allowed an architect, Mr. van Frank seeks a 
permanent injunction against the Division. The injunction sought after must prohibit the 
Division from making future determinations regarding what an architect may and may not 
do under state law and require that unless there is a building code violation or legitimate 
safety concern, the Division must accept an architect's stamped plans. Any and all 
concerns pertaining to the scope of the architect's work must be forwarded to DOPL. 
The Division is not qualified or authorized to even make a preliminary decision pertaining 
to the scope of work performed by a licensed architect. 
Mr. van Frank will continue to suffer irreparable harm due to his inability to 
practice architecture to the full extent that his state-granted license allows unless a 
permanent injunction against the Division is ordered. Irreparable harm has been defined 
in the context of injunctive relief as "wrongs of a repeated nature and continuing 
character " System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983), citing 
Black's Law Dictionary 707 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
The Division has already denied building permits based upon Mr. van Frank's 
building plans on two separate occasions for similar, if not identical, reasons. The 
Division has shown that it follows a policy of making determinations concerning the 
scope of a licensed architect's work. The Division is wholly unauthorized to make such 
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determinations. Injunctive relief is designed to prevent a threatened wrong or compel the 
cessation of a continuing-one. Systems Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427. A permanent 
injunction is necessary in this case to prevent the Division's continuing practice of 
making these unauthorized determinations. 
An injunction would not pose any damage to the Division that would outweigh the 
damage to Mr. van Frank if an injunction is not granted. In fact, an injunction would only 
ensure that the Division's actions and policies stay within the proper bounds set by State 
law. The injunction would not be adverse to the public interest and in fact would ensure 
that all architects licensed by the state of Utah are treated fairly and properly in their 
dealings with the Division. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. van Frank has a 
property right to practice architecture to the full extent that his State-granted license 
allows. The facts also show that this right has been diminished through the Division's 
arbitrary and unauthorized actions. The Division is wholly unauthorized to define the 
limits of an architects license. This determination must be left to the sole discretion of 
DOPL. 
Any legal remedies would be inadequate in this case. Money damages would not < 
prevent the Division from taking future arbitrary action against Mr. van Frank's 
architect's license. Only the granting of an injunction will ensure that the Division stops 
overstepping its authority in limiting the scope of Mr. van Frank's state-granted 
architect's license. 
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II. THE LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY'S BUILDINGS 
SERVICE DIVISION IS NOT HEARSAY. 
The district court's determination that the letter to Mr. van Frank is hearsay is 
incorrect and should be reversed. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court 
incorrectly states that the letter is inadmissible hearsay and does not provide any analysis 
or authority to support this ruling. (R.245) Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to 
Reconsider invited the district court to review or justify its ruling. It erred in not doing 
so. The district court's ruling determining that the letter is hearsay is unsupported by law. 
Questions regarding the meaning and application of a rule of evidence is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App. 322, ^  14, 142 
P.3d 581. The letter serves as admissible evidence sufficient to at the very least establish 
an issue of material fact. The district court's failure to consider it was not harmless error 
and its exclusion was prejudicial to Mr. van Frank's case. It should be deemed 
admissible and considered by the finder of fact as evidence of the Division's arbitrary 
actions taken against Mr. van Frank. 
Mr. van Frank offered the letter from the Director of the City's Building Services 
Division regarding a prior permit application to establish that the denial of the Buchanan 
permit was incident to a Division policy of making judgment calls about whether 
architect's plans exceeded the scope of engineering work allowed an architect. The 
circumstances in the Buchanan permit are factually indistinguishable from those of a prior 
experience Mr. Van Frank had with the Division, where it had explained why it was 
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unwilling to approve his architect's plans without a letter from an engineer certifying the 
engineering calculations Mr. van Frank had presented on the plans. Mr. van Frank 
submitted the letter from Orion Goff dated June 29, 2006 as evidence of the Division's 
policy to make "judgment calls" and improperly restrict the scope of Mr. van Frank's 
architect's license. 
The letter is not hearsay and is an admission by a party opponent under Rule 
801(d)(2)(C),(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Rule states, in pertinent part: 
"A statement is not hearsay if: The statement is offered against a party and 
is: a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or a statement by the party's agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made 
during the existence of the relationship." 
Mr. Goff is an agent or servant of the City, indeed he is the Director of the City's 
Building Services Division, and his statement was made in his official capacity as 
Director of the City's Building Services Division on the official letterhead of Salt Lake 
City Corporation. Salt Lake City Corporation as a municipal corporation is only capable 
of acting through its employees and agents. Mr. Goff was not speaking on behalf of < 
himself in the letter but was speaking on behalf of the Division and the City. This is 
evidenced by the fact that Mr. Goff signed the letter in his capacity as Director of the 
City's Building Services Division and that the letter was on official letterhead of the City. 
The letter from Orion Goff is not hearsay. The district court erred in ruling it was hearsay 
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and thus inadmissible and therefore ruling that Mr. van Frank had not produced evidence 
of a municipal policy in granting the City's motion for summary judgment. 
The letter indicates that the Division rejected Van Frank's plans in the Thomas 
case because it believed his calculations went beyond incidental engineering work. The 
facts of the permit denial in the Buchanan matter are so similar as to be indistinguishable. 
As in the Thomas matter, in the Buchanan matter the Division conditionally denied the 
issuance of a permit without an engineer's opinion confirming engineering calculations 
shown on the stamped plans of a licensed architect. The City accepted the plans in the 
Buchanan matter as written, without any change or modification once an engineer's 
opinion was provided. The only requirement for approval of the plans was thus an 
engineer's opinion, reflecting the Division's refusal to permit Mr. van Frank, a licensed 
architect, to engage in the incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under 
state law. Because the plans were accepted as drawn once an engineer's opinion was 
provided, it is manifest that the Division acted in the Buchanan case pursuant to the same 
practice that it had explained in denying the Thomas permit. Thus the letter from the 
Division director, combined with the factual similarity of the circumstances between the 
two cases where architect's plans were deemed insufficient without an engineer's 
opinion, provides at least a question of fact concerning the existence of a municipal 
policy. The district court's ruling that the Orion Goff letter is hearsay must be reversed. 
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IIL MR. VAN FRANK PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF A CITY POLICY. 
The district court incorrectly held that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court's decision 
should be reversed. The district court stated in its Memorandum Decision that Mr. van 
Frank failed to allege that "the City had an officially promulgated policy pursuant to 
which his constitutional rights were violated." (R.240) However, under the test for 
proving municipal liability as set forth by the district court in its decision, Mr. van Frank 
did provide sufficient evidence to create a question of fact concerning the existence of a 
municipal policy and the City failed to provide any evidence of its own to rebut or call 
into question the evidence presented by Mr. van Frank. Whether the district court 
correctly held that there were no genuine issues of disputed fact is reviewed for 
correctness. See K&TInc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994). 
Mr. van Frank has properly alleged the existence of a municipal policy by 
i 
providing evidence of a city policy to limit the scope of an architect's license by not 
allowing them to engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Architects are allowed 
to engage in the incidental practice of engineering pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 58- \ 
3a-102(6)(b). 
As recognized by the district court in its Memorandum Decision, municipal 
liability may be based on any of the following: 1) an express municipal policy; 2) a 
"widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal 
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policy, is so pervasive and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 
law; or 3) the decision of a person with 'final policymaking authority'." See City of St. 
Louis v. Praprtnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 127 (1988). (R.240) 
Mr. van Frank presented evidence of two separate instances where the City denied 
approval of his building plans and required the opinion of an engineer because it believed 
that Mr. van Frank's work went beyond the scope of engineering work an architect is 
allowed to perform. While the Court minimizes the importance of two instances as 
evidence of a municipal policy, the City has not provided any evidence to rebut Mr. van 
Frank's evidence. The fact is that Mr. van Frank provided evidence of two separate 
occasions where the City required that his building plans be reviewed and stamped by an 
engineer, effectively ignoring the fact that the seal of a licensed architect is sufficient 
under state law. See U.C.A. § 58-3a-602. 
Evidence of these decisions, at minimum, establishes a question of fact regarding 
the existence of an express municipal policy. The City has required on at least two 
separate occasions, with the same architect, that the architect's stamped plans be reviewed 
by an engineer. No evidence has been presented by the City to refute the evidence which 
demonstrates that the actions taken by the City against Mr. van Frank were in fact done in 
furtherance of an express municipal policy. 
The City's actions against Mr. van Frank also serve as evidence sufficient to raise 
a question of fact of a "widespread practice" that while not formally authorized by law, is 
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a well settled policy within the City's Building Services Division. Again, the City 
provided no evidence to rebut the evidence presented by Mr. van Frank that the City's 
actions against him were done in the furtherance of a widespread practice. The City has 
taken action against the scope of Mr. van Frank's architect's license on two separate but 
factually indistinguishable occasions. At a minimum, there is a material issue of fact as to 
the existence of a widespread practice by the City to restrict and limit the scope of an 
architect's license without due process. 
These decisions were made and/or authorized and defended by Orion Goff, 
Director of the City's Building Services Division. As director, Mr. Goff has "final policy 
making authority" regarding the approval of building permits. Mr. van Frank provided 
sound evidence of repeated, similar decisions by a person with policy making authority 
which violated his due process rights while the City provided no evidence to refute the 
same. There is at minimum a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the actions 
taken by the City against Mr. van Frank were implemented by a person with "final 
policymaking authority." 
While the district court minimizes the importance of two instances as evidence of a \ 
municipal policy, the City has not provided any evidence to rebut Mr. van Frank's 
evidence. Of how many instances must Mr. van Frank provide evidence before the City 
is required to provide at least some contrary evidence? At minimum, Mr. van Frank has 
established a material issue of fact regarding the existence of a municipal policy that 
i 
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violated his due process rights. The trier of fact could find from the evidence of two 
separate and near identical occasions where the City required that Mr. van Frank's 
building plans be reviewed and stamped by an engineer, that the city has a policy of 
denying architects the ability to engage in the incidental practice of engineering. 
The evidence submitted by Mr. van Frank is sufficient to establish a factual dispute 
warranting the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment when the City has not 
provided any evidence or explanation or rationale for requiring an engineer's opinion 
before approving the stamped building plans of a licensed architect. Mr. van Frank 
sufficiently alleged the existence of a municipal policy and provided evidence of its 
existence sufficient to raise an issue of fact. The district court's ruling that Mr. van Frank 
has failed to do so is incorrect and should be reversed. 
IV. MR. VAN FRANK ESTABLISHED GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
The district court correctly ruled that Mr. van Frank has standing to seek damages 
under his of claims for relief but incorrectly ruled that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to 
seek injunctive relief "of the breadth prayed for in his Complaint." (R.242) This latter 
ruling should be reversed. Mr. van Frank does indeed have standing to seek injunctive 
relief against the City. The breadth of relief sought by Mr. van Frank is not a correct 
basis for denying Mr. van Frank's motion for summary judgment and granting the City's 
motion for the same. 
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In the Complaint, Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction to prevent the City from 
restricting the license of an architect by making determinations that an architect has 
exceeded the scope of their license and requiring the City to accept all building plans 
bearing the stamped seal of a licensed architect. (R. 11,12) 
The United States Supreme Court held that to establish standing for prospective 
relief, "a plaintiff must demonstrate the realistic probability that he will again be 
subjected to the same injurious conduct." See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
101-02 (1983). The district court downplayed the significance of the City's actions 
against Mr. van Frank on two separate but factually indistinguishable occasions. The 
district court implies in its decision that more must be shown to prove that there is a high 
probability that the City will take the same action against Mr. van Frank in the future. 
But given the fact that the City did not provide any evidence or explanation for its actions 
against Mr. van Frank under the building code, it is reasonably probable that the City 
would take similar action against Mr. van Frank and/or other architects. The City never 
presented any evidence that Mr. van Frank's plans were unsafe or otherwise violated the 
building code and did not provide any analysis as to why his work exceeded the scope of < 
engineering work that an architect may perform under state law, even assuming it had 
authority to do so. The City has also failed to argue or present evidence that these two 
instances involving Mr. van Frank were exceptional or unlikely to occur again. The fact 
that no evidence or analysis was ever presented by the City is indicative of the arbitrary 
i 
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nature of the City's decisions on both occasions and establishes a question as to the 
realistic probability that the City will continue to make arbitrary and capricious "judgment 
calls" regarding the scope of an architect's license. 
Mr. van Frank submits that the district court's ruling on this issue is in error and 
should be reversed in light of the evidence provided by Mr. van Frank and the complete 
lack of evidence provided by the City. If this Court believes the relief sought by Mr. van 
Frank was too broad it may tailor the relief sought to prevent further violation of Mr. van 
Frank's right to due process. However, the scope of Mr. van Frank's prayer for relief was 
not a proper basis to dismiss the entire injunction claim and the district court erred in so 
ruling. 
V. MR. VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION IS PROPERLY SUPPORTED FOR 
PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Mr. van Frank's statements of fact presented in his declaration are properly 
supported for purposes of summary judgment and should have been considered by the 
district court. The district court's disregard for these statements is not harmless error and 
is prejudicial to Mr. van Frank's case. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court cites with approval the City's 
argument that certain statements in Mr. van Frank's declaration are not supported by 
evidence in the record and do not support Mr. van Frank's allegations. (R.244-45) 
Specifically, the Court cites to paragraph four of Mr. van Frank's declaration in which he 
states that his calculations "utilized and applied straight-forward formulas commonly 
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used by architects, engineers, and others in the building profession." (R.61) This 
statement and others similar to it in the declaration are admissible. 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence..." Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P. It 
is undisputed that Mr. van Frank is a licensed architect with experience sufficient to have 
personal knowledge as to the common practices of architects. Mr. van Frank is qualified 
to opine as to the kind of calculations he made on his building plans and whether such 
calculations are commonly made in his profession. In the absence of any contrary 
evidence, Mr. van Frank's opinions are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. The 
Court's acceptance of the City's argument that these statements of fact are unsupported 
by admissible evidence is in error. Mr. van Frank's Declaration is properly supported for 
purposes of summary judgment and should have been considered by the district court. 
The Declaration at the very least creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment, especially given the fact that the City presented no admissible 
evidence to support its Motion or any of its subsequent memoranda. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. van Frank requests at a minimum that the district court's ruling granting the 
City's motion for summary judgment be reversed and remanded for trial. Mr. van Frank 
has established that there are genuine issues of material fact warranting the denial of the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore it is requested that this Court rule 
37 
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that the statements made in Mr. van Frank's Declaration are admissible and that the letter 
from Orion Goff, Director of the City's Building Services Division, is not hearsay and 
therefore admissible. In light of this evidence, the Court should find that Mr. van Frank's 
claims have merit, are supported by admissible evidence and that Mr. van Frank is 
entitled to a permanent injunction against the City to prevent it from engaging in future 
arbitrary judgment calls which restrict the scope of Mr. van Frank's state-issued 
architect's license. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 2011. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
L,l IrtlU 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
Justin D. Hatch 
Attorneys for Appellant, Roger van Frank 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
J. Wesley Robinson 
Attorney for Defendant 
Room 505, City and County Building 
451 South State Street 
P.O. Box 145478 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5478 
j... tftih 
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Orion Goff Letter (R.87-89) 
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DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT DF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT MAYOR 
BUILDING SERVICES AND LICENSING DIVISION 
June 29, 2006 :z 
Roger vanFrank 
1445 Michigan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
RE: Architectural Drawings for 1332 Shannon Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. vanFrank: 
Mr. vanFrank thanks for taking the time to visit my office this week to discuss the project at 1332 
Shannon Street in Salt Lake City. It was a pleasure to meet with you and review a beautiful set 
of hand-written architectural drawings that you produced, which represent a great deal of care 
not common to current electronically prepared drawings. 
I would like to take this time to review our discussion and memorialize in writing the 
understanding reached in the meeting. We agreed that the working drawings presented at our 
public counter for review and subsequent approval of a building permit are a complete set of 
plans and more than adequately represent the work to be accomplished. We also agree that 
there is some structural work included in these drawings that we could (and did) accept as 
'incidental' to your architectural work on the drawings. 
In the meeting we also discussed the fact that the Plan Review Staff at our public counter made 
a judgment call, that due to the structural work in the new Breezeway / porte-cochere area, staff 
used the International Building Code Section 1614.3 to make this judgment. The code states 
that; 
EB] 1614.3 Alterations. Alterations are permitted to be made to any structure 
without requiring the structure to comply with Sections 1613 through 1623 
provided the alterations conform to the requirements for a new structure. 
Alterations that increase the seismic force in any existing structural element be 
more than 5 percent or decrease the design strength of any existing structural 
element to resist seismic forces by more than 5 percent shall not be permitted 
unless the entire seismic-force-resisting system is determined to conform to 
Sections 1613 through 1623 for a new structure. 
Staff made the judgment based on the code language; that removing the structural walls of the 
existing building would obviously affect more than 5% of the building element and thus required 
a lateral analysis. It is our judgment, based on Utah State Code R156-3a-102 that a lateral 
analysis of the area in question to determine the seismic resisting forces would not constitute 
'incidental' work for an architect and in fact needed to be done by a licensed professional ( 
engineer. Thus, the contractor enlisted the services of an engineer to do the analysis and 
produce a report. The analysis was for the area designated on the plans as the 'breezeway1 
A. L D U I S ZUNGUZE 
CDMM. DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR 
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only. Please note that we were perfectly willing to consider the other 'engineering' work on the 
drawings as being incidental to the architects design. 
Thank you again for the opportunity to meet with you and discuss this issue. As a result of our 
meeting and the points you make, we will do additional research on the State law in conjunction 
with our legal representatives and train staff to make judgments based upon its most prudent 
interpretation. 
As discussed, we are willing to meet with you in advance of submittal to discuss this issue as it 
relates to any other projects you wish to submit to the City for permit. Please call me if you have 
any questions whatsoever in reference to the project. My office phone is (801) 535-6681 and 
my cell phone number is (801) 706-0940. 
Respectfully, f~\ 
Orion Goff, CBO 
Building Official 
Director, Building Services and Business Licensing 
Cc; Mr. and Mrs. Kim Thomas 
D. J. Baxter, Mayors Office 
Louis Zunguze, Director, Community Development 
Brent Wilde, Assistant Director, Community Development 
Larry Butcher, Plan Review Administrator 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
District Court Memorandum Decision (R.236-47) 
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RLEDD1STR5GT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 1 6 2010 
\ \ tt$ALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ 1—Pj Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER VAN FRANK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 080919752 
DATE: SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 
Several motions came before the Court for hearing on June 16, 2010, at the 
conclusion of which, the Court took them under advisement On July 22, 2010, the • 
Court asked counsel for the parties to provide it with supplemental authorities on two 
key points related to these motions. Counsel for the Plaintiff provided authorities as 
requested, but candidly acknowledged that he could find ho case law factually on point; 
counsel for the Defendant did not submit any additional authority. The matter was . 
again submitted for decision on August 10, 2010. Having reviewed the papers, 
including the supplemental authorities, and considered the arguments of counsel, the 
motions are ripe for decision and the Court hereby addresses them in turn. 
I. THE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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The Defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City"), moves for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiff, Roger van Frank, has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted; he lacks standing to sue the City; he has failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies;1 and no constitutional violation has occurred. 
A. The Undisputed Material Facts 
For purposes of this motion, the parties agree on these material facts: Mr. van 
Frank is a licensed architect who provided architectural services for William Buchanan 
in approximately June 2007. Mr. Buchanan used Mr. van Frank's architectural drawings 
to apply for a building permit with the City's Building Services and Licensing Division 
("the Division"). The Division denied Mr. Buchanan's application for a permit at least in 
part because it required a structural engineer's opinion regarding Mr. van Frank's 
calculations, and/or certifying the safety of the floor system design. Mr. van Frank 
alleges that the City improperly denied the permit to Mr. Buchanan, and denied Mr. van 
Frank due process by allegedly determining that he exceeded the scope of his 
architect's license. Further, it interfered with his economic relationship with his client, 
undermined his client's confidence in him, and threatened his ability to continue working 
with Mr. Buchanan or his contractor. In doing so, it usurped the role of the Architect's 
Licensing Board of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL") of 
the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah. Finally, Mr. van Frank claims that 
the City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's building permit deprived him without due process of 
a property right to practice architecture, and portrayed him in a false light or defamed 
!This ground was stated in the motion but not briefed in the City's supporting 
memorandum. < 
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him. Mr. van Frank alleges that the City for similar reasons denied another clients 
application for a building permit. 
Mr. van Frank in opposing the City's motion set forth a statement of additional 
material facts, to which the City replied in opposition, noting that these are not.properly 
supported for purposes of a summary judgment motion and therefore not properly 
considered by the Court. Some examples are set forth below in connection with the 
Court's discussion of Mr. van Frank's Statement of Material Facts in support of his own 
motion for summary judgment. 
Mr. van Frank seeks damages, an award of attorney's fees, and a permanent 
and mandatory injunction restraining the City "from restricting the lawful practice of 
architecture on the basis that an architect has exceeded the scope of his license in 
engaging in the incidental practice of engineering and from denying building permits to 
the clients of licensed architects on such basis." He urges the Court to require the City 
to seek review from the Department of Commerce instead of denying a permit in 
circumstances similar to his, and to "accept an architect's stamp appearing on plans as 
evidence that the plans and calculations shown thereon have been competently 
prepared by a licensed professional." 
B. Whether the Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which 
Relief May Be Granted 
The City's first argument is that Mr. van Frank's Complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. Its supporting memorandum provides no analysis 
pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but challenges Mr. van Frank's right 
to relief based on the facts he asserts in the Complaint-an argument more commonly 
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made under the aegis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
The City notes that Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint identifies no specific 
Constitutional or federal basis for his causes of action, but instead states that his due 
process rights have been violated. The City proceeds with an analysis of the Amended 
Complaint pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983. 
Reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court confirms that there is no explicit 
reference to that statute. Instead, under the First Claim for Relief (Civil Rights 
Violation), Mr. van Frank states, "In making a determination that Plaintiff had engaged 
in unprofessional conduct by violating the scope of incidental practice of engineering 
allowed an architect under state law without due process, in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States and the Constitution of Utah, Defendant violated Plaintiffs civil 
rights and impaired a property interest of Plaintiff, namely the right to practice 
architecture as licensed by the State of Utah." 
The Court concludes that Mr. van Frank's factual allegations set forth in the 
Amended Complaint, are sufficient. He has alleged that the City's actions in rejecting 
the plans his client submitted with incidental engineering calculations he was entitled to 
make pursuant to his architect's license, deprived him of a property interest secured by 
the United States Constitution and other law, without affording him an opportunity to be 
heard, These are colorable claims that the City's actions violated his due process 
rights. 
The City also points out, correctly, that tort claims such as interference with 
business relations and defamation do not give rise to a cause of action for violation of 
due process under section 1983. But Mr. van Frank's Complaint did not assert a tort 
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claim, and the Court interprets his use of these phrases as a characterization of the 
stigmatizing injuries he received, rather than an assertion of a substantive claim for 
relief. 
Next, the City argues that because it cannot be liable under section 1983 based 
on a theory of respondeat superior, and Mr, van Frank "has not alleged the existence of 
any custom, policy or practice of the City that contributed in any way to the alleged 
constitutional violations," he has not stated a claim for relief. 
Municipal liability may be based on any of the following: (1) an express municipal 
policy; (2) a "widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express 
municipal policy, is 'so pervasive and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage1 
with the force of law;" or (3) the decision of a person with "final policymaking authority." 
City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,123,127 (1988). The analysis focuses on 
whether Mr. van Frank's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and if so, 
whether the City is responsible for that violation. 
Mr. van Frank has not alleged that the City had an officially promulgated policy 
pursuant to which his constitutional rights were violated. Instead, what he alleges is 
that the City made a determination that Mr. van Frank in two instances exceeded the 
scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state law. Mr. 
van Frank's memorandum identifies these as the "policy" pursuant to which he was 
deprived, without an opportunity to be heard, of his property right interest in the full 
exercise of his license. But a two-instance limit on Mr. van Frank's incidental practice of 
engineering is not a deprivation of his right to practice the occupation for which he has 
been licensed, and the Court concludes that Mr. van Frank has not stated a claim upon 
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which relief can be granted with respect to municipal liability. The City's motion for 
summary judgment on this basis is accordingly granted. 
C. Whether Mr. Van Frank Has Standing to Sue the City 
The City argues that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to sue the City over its denial 
of a building permit sought by his client, who, it contends is the only person with 
standing to bring such a suit. This section of the City's memorandum in support of its 
motion cites no authority for its position, and the City declined the Court's request to 
provide supplemental authority on this point. 
Mr. van Frank's opposition memorandum identifies the basic elements of 
establishing standing: a party must show that he has been or will be adversely affected 
by the challenged actions, allege a causal relationship between the injury, the 
challenged actions, and the relief requested, and the relief request must be 
substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. He notes that each of these elements 
is present in this case, albeit without authority, and argues that the identity of the 
person applying for the permit does not determine standing. Instead, he focuses on the 
harm to him as a consequence of the City's denial: it denied him the ability to engage in 
the incidental practice of engineering, thereby harming his reputation with his clients. 
In reply, the City argues that none of its actions impaired Mr. van Frank's license, 
he has no property interest in the incidental practice of engineering that would entitle 
him to the protections he seeks, and further his allegations of damage to his 
professional reputation are not actionable, but it does not revisit the argument that Mr: 
van Frank's client is the only person with standing to bring an action based on the 
denial of the building permit. 
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A plaintiff has standing to sue under section 1983 if he or she meets traditional 
standing requirements, and while it is generally true that in such actions a plaintiff must 
assert her own rights and not the rights of a third party, when the rights of these 
persons are closely related, the action may proceed. See e.g. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106,113-116 (1976). The Court concludes that Mr. van Frank has standing with 
respect to the claims for which he seeks damages. 
This is not the end of the analysis, however. Mr. van Frank's prayer for relief 
includes a request for a permanent and mandatory injunction restraining the City "from 
restricting a licensed architect's ability to practice architecture by making any 
determination that such architect has exceeded the scope of incidental practice of 
engineering allowed an architect under state law, requiring Defendants to accept plans 
stamped by a licensed architect as competently drawn." 
The United States Supreme Court has established a specific doctrine when a 
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983. To establish standing for 
prospective relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate the realistic probability that he will again 
be subjected to the same injurious conduct. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95,101-102 (1983). In this case, that would depend upon whether the City is likely 
to reject Mr. van Frank's plans for similar reasons in the future. The fact that it has 
done so on two occasions in the past is not dispositive of whether there is a sufficient 
probability that it will do so in the future, either with respect to Mr. van Frank or the 
entire universe of licensed architects whose clients may seek City permits. The Court 
concludes that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to seek injunctive relief of the breadth 
prayed for in his Complaint, and the City therefore is entitled to summary judgment on 
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Mr; van Frank's Second Claim for Relief. 
D. Whether a Constitutional Violation Occurred 
The City's final argument is that it has taken no action that deprived Mr. van 
Frank of his constitutionally protected property rights-it merely denied Mr. Buchanan's 
application for a building permit based on legitimate safety concerns regarding the 
plans and drawings submitted. The rest of its argument is essentially a variation on its 
standing argument and its argument that Mr. van Frank's license was not affected by 
any action taken by the City. Mr. van Frank responds by pointing to the City's asserted 
reason for denying Mr. Buchanan's building permit, with no discussion of safety or 
building codes. He proceeds with a variation of his argument that the City lacks the 
authority to determine that an architect's engineering was more than incidental. 
Because these arguments have been addressed above, the Court need not repeat, 
them here. 
E. Conclusion 
The Court grants the City's motion for summary judgment because the City's 
rejection of proposed pians in two instances does not demonstrate a policy of limiting 
Mr. van Frank's practice of architecture incidental to which he may engage in 
engineering. The Court denies the'City's motion insofar as it is based upon an 
argument that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to seek damages* but grants it insofar as it 
seeks injunctive relief of the scope set forth in the Complaint's Second Claim for Relief. 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Mr. van Frank moves the Court to strike portions of the Defendant's Reply 
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Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment because some of the factual 
statements that responded to his Additional Statement of Facts are unsupported by 
citation to admissible evidence, and because two arguments are raised for the first time 
and are not properly included in a reply memorandum. 
The City responds that the motion was not filed in a timely fashion, relying upon 
Rule 12(h), Mr. van Frank correctly points.out that Rule 12(h) applies to pleadings, and 
not to a motion. 
The City adds that Mr. van Frank's motion lacks specificity, and fails to 
appreciate that most of its responses to his additional facts were objections based on 
various reasons. The Court determines that the motion must be denied for the reasons 
stated by the City. Similarly, his motion with respect to the City's arguments must be 
denied. These were an appropriate response to.Mr. van Frank's opposition 
memorandum. 
III. PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Mr. van Frank moves for summary judgment, seeking damages and a permanent 
injunction against the City for its alleged violation of his substantive due process rights. 
In support of his motion, Mr. van Frank sets forth a statement of material facts that does 
not substantially differ from the facts set forth above in connection with the City's motion 
and they need not be repeated in this section. 
Significantly, however, the City disputes some of Mr. van Frank's statements of 
material fact, noting that these are not properly supported for purposes of a summary 
judgment motion and therefore not properly considered by the Court. For example, Mr. 
van Frank stated that his calculations "utilized and applied straight-forward formulas 
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commonly used by architects, engineers, and others in the building profession." It 
notes that this is a statement of opinion, not supported by evidence in the record that 
wouid be admissible at trial. Similarly, Mr. van Frank's allegations regarding the basis 
for the Division's conditional denial of Mr. Buchanan's building permit are based on 
unspecified information and belief. Events connected with another client's case are 
supported by inadmissible hearsay. They point out that there is no admissible evidence 
in support of Mr. van Frank's allegations that the Division made determinations 
concerning the scope of practice permitted under state licensing law. "At most, the 
factual record demonstrates that the Division required the opinion of a structural 
engineer to certify the safety of the proposed building design before it would approve 
the application for a building permit." 
Mr. van Frank argues that the Division has no authority under State Code or City 
ordinance to determine whether an architect exceeded the permissible scope of 
incidental engineering permitted by Utah law. He contends that the Division's actions in 
requiring his client to obtain an engineer's opinion as to the accuracy of his calculations, 
and as a condition for approving the plans he drew, denied him the ability to practice his 
profession. 
The Court would be compelled to deny Mr. van Frank's motion on the bases of 
these factual disputes. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in connection with its 
analysis of the City's motion for summary judgment, it also determines that as a matter 
of law, Mr. van Frank is not entitled to summary judgment. The! motion is therefore 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
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For the reasons set forth above, Mr. van Frank's Motion to Strike Portions of 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment is denied; the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. This Memorandum Decision shall constitute the order of the 
Court. 
Dated this 
J f^.4MrM&. 
4cuWi KATEA. TOOMEY' % 
DIST^JCJ^p^RT JUDGE 
SALT 
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